

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1183

To require the President to transmit to Congress a report on contingency plans regarding possible developments in Iraq.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 16, 2007

Mr. UDALL of Colorado introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To require the President to transmit to Congress a report on contingency plans regarding possible developments in Iraq.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE.**

4 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Iraq Contingency Planning Act”.

6 (b) **PURPOSE.**—The purpose of this Act is to require
7 the President to promptly inform Congress regarding what
8 contingency plans are or will be in place to respond to

1 three scenarios regarding future developments in Iraq as
2 identified by the most recent National Intelligence Esti-
3 mate on Iraq.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress finds as follows:

6 (1) The United States initiated combat oper-
7 ations against the Saddam Hussein regime on
8 March 19, 2003, and concluded those operations in
9 April 2004 with the defeat of the Iraqi military and
10 the collapse of the Hussein regime.

11 (2) The Bush Administration had been warned
12 that while military action against the Hussein re-
13 gime would likely succeed, rebuilding Iraq and win-
14 ning the peace would be more difficult. In particular,
15 intelligence reports from the Defense Intelligence
16 Agency, the Pentagon's Joint Staff, the Department
17 of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and
18 the Central Intelligence Agency's National Intel-
19 ligence Council warned that United States troops
20 could face significant postwar resistance. An Army
21 War College report from February 2003 warned that
22 without an "overwhelming" effort to prepare for the
23 United States occupation of Iraq, "The United
24 States may find itself in a radically different world
25 over the next few years, a world in which the threat

1 of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale shadow of new
2 problems of America's own making.”.

3 (3) Despite these warnings, the Bush Adminis-
4 tration invaded Iraq without a comprehensive plan
5 in place to secure and rebuild the country.

6 (4) United States Armed Forces personnel have
7 remained in Iraq since the beginning of combat op-
8 erations, and in over nearly four years of war, hun-
9 dreds of thousands of members of the Armed Forces
10 have served with honor and distinction in Iraq, over
11 3,100 members of the Armed Forces have died, and
12 over 22,500 members of the Armed Forces have
13 been wounded.

14 (5) On January 10, 2007, after years of grow-
15 ing sectarian violence in Iraq, President George W.
16 Bush addressed the American people to announce a
17 plan entitled “The New Way Forward in Iraq”, con-
18 sisting of the additional deployments of at least
19 21,500 United States troops in Iraq.

20 (6) On January 16, 2007, the Secretary of De-
21 fense said that “we expect in certain areas to be able
22 to see whether the Iraqi government is carrying out
23 the commitments that it has made and that are so
24 critical to the success of this strategy . . . within two
25 or three months.”.

1 (7) On February 5, 2007, the President sub-
2 mitted a request for supplemental appropriations for
3 fiscal year 2007, including \$5,600,000,000 to in-
4 crease United States forces in the Iraqi theater of
5 operations to support the Government of Iraq with
6 21,500 United States ground forces and an ex-
7 panded Naval presence. At the same time, the Presi-
8 dent also submitted a proposed budget for fiscal
9 year 2008 which did not request funding for these
10 additional troops in Iraq.

11 (8) On February 1, 2007, the intelligence com-
12 munity presented to the President the first National
13 Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq in nearly four
14 years.

15 (9) The NIE, the most authoritative written
16 judgment of the Director of National Intelligence
17 with respect to Iraq, states that “Iraqi society’s
18 growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the
19 security forces and the state in general, and all
20 sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driv-
21 ing an increase in communal and insurgent violence
22 and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse
23 these conditions show measurable progress during
24 ... the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the

1 overall security situation will continue to deterio-
2 rate.”.

3 (10) The NIE states that as Iraq’s security en-
4 vironment worsens, three prospective security paths
5 could emerge—

6 (A) chaos leading to partition;

7 (B) emergence of a Shia strongman; or

8 (C) anarchic fragmentation of power.

9 (11) Congress needs to know how the Adminis-
10 tration expects to respond to each of those possibili-
11 ties, and what specific plans are being taken and
12 what specific plans are being developed to be able to
13 respond to such possibilities.

14 **SEC. 3. REPORT ON CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR IRAQ.**

15 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than June 30,
16 2007, the President shall transmit to the Committees on
17 Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the
18 Senate a report detailing contingency plans for how the
19 Department of Defense and other departments and agen-
20 cies of the Federal Government will respond to the fol-
21 lowing three prospective security paths in Iraq, as outlined
22 in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq:

23 (1) CHAOS LEADING TO PARTITION.—Described
24 by the NIE as follows: “A rapid deterioration in the
25 capacity of Iraq’s central government to function,

1 security services and other aspects of sovereignty
2 would collapse. Resulting widespread fighting could
3 produce de facto partition, dividing Iraq into three
4 mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this mag-
5 nitude would generate fierce violence for at least sev-
6 eral years, ranging well beyond the time frame of
7 this estimate, before settling into a partially stable
8 end-state.”.

9 (2) EMERGENCE OF A SHIA STRONGMAN.—De-
10 scribed by the NIE as follows: “Instead of a disinte-
11 grating central government producing partition, a
12 security implosion could lead Iraq’s potentially most
13 powerful group, the Shia, to assert its latent
14 strength.”.

15 (3) ANARCHIC FRAGMENTATION OF POWER.—
16 Described by the NIE as follows: “The emergence of
17 a checkered pattern of local control would present
18 the greatest potential for instability, mixing extreme
19 ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating intra-group
20 clashes.”.

21 (b) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.—The report shall in-
22 clude detailed information regarding the proposed role of
23 the United States Armed Forces under each of the three
24 prospective security paths referred to in subsection (a), in-
25 cluding a comprehensive analysis to identify and justify

- 1 the number of United States troops needed in each case,
- 2 and the proposed roles of other departments and agencies
- 3 of the Federal Government.

